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Abstract
This paper presents an agent-based model of fixed-term aca-
demic employment in a competitive research funding envi-
ronment based on UK academia. The goal of the model is
to investigate the effects of job insecurity on research pro-
ductivity. Agents may be either established academics who
may apply for grants, or postdoctoral researchers who are un-
able to apply for grants and experience hardship when reach-
ing the end of their fixed-term contracts. Model results show
that in general adding fixed-term postdocs to the system pro-
duces less total research output than adding half as many per-
manent academics. An in-depth sensitivity analysis is per-
formed across postdoc scenarios, and indicates that promot-
ing more postdocs into permanent positions produces signifi-
cant increases in research output.
Introduction
In recent decades the career landscape for academics has
changed markedly. Upon graduating with a PhD, many as-
piring academics enter a series of fixed-term postdoctoral
research fellowships. Permanent positions are increasingly
difficult to come by – in the UK, for example, only 3.5% of
PhD graduates will succeed in getting an academic position
(Powell, 2015). Intense competition for academic posts cou-
pled with ever-increasing numbers of PhD graduates means
that the academic workforce in the UK has shifted substan-
tially toward fixed-term contracts – currently 68% of re-
searchers in the UK are on fixed-term contracts (University
and College Union, 2015).
Much has been written about the impact insecure aca-
demic working conditions can have on the individual. Ac-
cording to the University and College Union report Making
Ends Meet – The Human Costs of Casualisation in Higher
Education some 21% of UK academics on fixed-term or
zero-hour contracts have trouble putting food on their din-
ner tables, despite many of these individuals having higher
degrees and substantial experience. In the United States,
adjunct professor positions – casualised positions in which
teaching staff are paid per course or by the hour at very
low rates, often without health insurance – now make up
the overwhelming majority of academic positions on offer.
Some 75% of US academics are now ‘contingent teaching
faculty’, or adjuncts, a ten-fold increase since 1975 (Hoeller,
2014).
In the case of funding, evidence suggests that the current
trajectory of academia – toward larger grants targeted at ‘re-
search leaders’, which tend to bring more fixed-term post-
docs with them – is not necessarily a productive one. A
study of the projects funded by the National Sciences and
Engineering Council of Canada found that scientific impact
was a decreasing function of funding – bigger projects pro-
duced less impact per dollar than smaller ones (Fortin and
Currie, 2013). Similarly, a recent study of 398 project PIs in
the UK found that while productivity – number of publica-
tions – was positively correlated with funding, the relation-
ship with impact factor and citation number was far weaker,
and diminishing returns set in as funding levels rise (Cook
et al., 2015).
While there have been modelling studies examining com-
petitive research funding systems and illuminating some of
these shortcomings (Geard and Noble, 2010), currently we
are unaware of any attempts to model the structure of aca-
demic careers. This seems a significant oversight given the
prevalence of stress and job dissatisfaction reported by post-
docs worldwide (Van der Weijden et al., 2015). In such cir-
cumstances, could the stress and uncertainty of postdoc em-
ployment lead to substantial impact on research productivity
in academia?
Given that the majority of postdocs are hired with grant
funding, we suggest that understanding the impact of the
trend towards fixed-term contracts will require an exami-
nation of both competitive research funding structures and
insecure postdoctoral employment. This paper presents a
first attempt at modelling a simple academic system which
incorporates both of these key elements. We propose that
modelling techniques drawn from complex systems science
are highly appropriate for this kind of meta-research, as we
need to explicitly represent the complex and inter-related na-
ture of sector-wide constructs like research funding councils
and academic career paths.
Utilising previous work on modelling research funding
(Geard and Noble, 2010), we have constructed an agent-
based model in which established academics compete for
grants while postdocs compete for tenure. By examining the
impact of these interrelated systems on overall research pro-
ductivity we seek a deeper understanding of how the trend
toward fixed-term contracts in academic employment may
have affected the academic community. Performing a de-
tailed sensitivity analysis allows us to examine the impact of
key model parameters on overall research output.
The Simulation Model
The simulation model used here is based substantially on
previous work by Geard and Noble (2010). The same code
base was used as a starting point, and the postdoc employ-
ment mechanisms were added on top of this core functional-
ity. Model parameters and postdoc behaviour were inspired
by the characteristics of UK academia. A brief summary of
the funding model will be provided here; for further details,
please see the original paper.
Core Research Funding Model
The model represents research funding as a competitive bid-
ding process, in which academic agents submit proposals
each semester in the hope of obtaining a grant. Here we as-
sume that 30% of research proposals are funded, so agents
attempt to get their research funded by investing time into
bid preparation. The grant evaluation process in the model
evaluates proposals based on the research quality of the sub-
mitting agent and the amount of time spent preparing the bid
– we also assume diminishing returns on time spent.
Agents each have an individual research quality, which
is a figure ranging between 0 and 1. Each semester, agents
produce research output based on their research quality and
modified according to their time allocation strategy for bid
preparation. The final output numbers are conceptualised as
‘units of research’, i.e., scientific publications.
Agents who are funded benefit from an increase to their
research quality, which is intended to represent the mate-
rial benefits of research funding: increased resources, time
bought out from teaching obligations, and so forth. How-
ever, getting proposals funded requires bid preparation time,
which in turn reduces research productivity. Agents make
these decisions by looking at their history of successful ap-
plications in the recent past and altering their time alloca-
tions to attempt to optimise their success rates – the ‘Mem-
ory A’ strategy in Geard and Noble (2010). Here we de-
fined the recent past as the previous ten semesters, as shorter
memories produced more chaotic application behaviour due
to the volatility introduced by the regular influxes of new
agents in the baseline and postdoc scenarios.
Baseline Model: Simple Growing Population
The core funding model begins with an initial population of
100 established academics which stays static as the simula-
tion runs for 100 semesters. For this paper we first developed
a basic extension of the model which assumes that some por-
tion of the disbursed grant funding is used to fund additional
permanent academic positions. This allows us to provide a
simple baseline case to compare with the postdoc scenarios.
Every semester, a number of additional academics are
added to the system equal to half the number of disbursed
grants, rounded up. These academics are given a random
level of individual research quality, which is reduced slightly
for the first two semesters to represent their acclimatisation
process as they join the ranks of tenured faculty. Otherwise
these new academics behave identically to the established
academics.
Postdoc Model
Postdocs were added to the simulation through the imple-
mentation of some additional mechanisms. While the core
funding model remains the same, as does the behaviour of
the established academics, in the postdoc case additional
agents with unique properties are added to the simulation
each semester.
When a grant is successfully funded, the agent who sub-
mitted the grant receives the same beneficial increase to their
research quality as in the baseline case. In addition, every
grant funds a new postdoc who is then added to the simula-
tion. Postdocs differ from established academics in several
key aspects:
1. Postdocs spend 100% of their time doing research
2. Postdocs are unable to apply for grants
3. Postdocs are on fixed-term contracts, ranging from 4 to
10 semesters in length
4. New postdocs experience the same small reduction in re-
search quality as new academics in the baseline scenario
5. At the end of their contract postdocs experience a reduc-
tion in research quality for their final two semesters
Note that the inability of postdocs to apply for grants is
not true everywhere – postdocs in the UK are unable to ap-
ply for grants, but can do so in Australia, for example. In
some countries this varies between funding agencies, as in
the United States.
At the end of a contract, some postdocs will be fortunate
enough to get promoted into a permanent position. Pro-
moted postdocs are converted into established academics,
will become able to apply for grants, and must devote some
portion of their research time to bid preparation. The like-
lihood of being promoted is determined by a parameter, the
promotion chance, which will be examined in detail later
in this paper. The default promotion chance is 15%, a rate
which was thought to be reasonable after comparing the
Figure 1: Mean research output per academic across five
different scenarios. The Growing Population scenario
does not include postdocs.
Figure 2: Total research output for the entire system
across five different scenarios. The Growing Population
scenario does not include postdocs.
widely variable statistics between different UK higher ed-
ucation organisations.
In the real world, promotion is not always a direct result of
performance – timing, luck, geographical location, connec-
tions, and even nepotism can play a role. In order to examine
the role of merit-based promotion in this model, we allow
the promotion process to be set to either take into account
an agent’s research quality, or to promote a random selec-
tion of agents. In the former case, agents are ranked by re-
search quality and a percentage of the top-ranked agents cor-
responding to the promotion chance will be advanced into
permanent positions. In the latter case, a random sample of
equivalent size is selected to be promoted. These two cases
are referred to as RQ and noRQ scenarios in the Results sec-
tion. Agents who are not promoted are removed from the
system and may no longer contribute to research output.
In order to model the notion that postdocs provide useful
experience and thus increase the quality of new permanent
academics, we included an option for a mentoring bonus for
newly-promoted agents. In the mentoring scenario, newly-
promoted agents gain a significant bonus to research quality
to represent the proposed benefit of this intensive research
experience. The mentoring and no-mentoring scenarios are
referred to later as M and noM, respectively. In the default
scenario, the mentoring bonus adds an additional 0.5 to an
agent’s research quality.
Results
In order to examine the impact of fixed-term contracts on
academic research productivity, we analysed the research
output of a number of different scenarios. The first set of
scenarios compares a variety of postdoc settings with the
baseline growing population case. The second and third
sets of scenarios investigate the postdoc model more deeply,
looking at the impact of varying the promotion chances of
postdocs and the levels of job-hunting stress they experi-
ence at the end of a contract, respectively. All three of these
sets of scenarios used default settings of the key parameters
as follows: postdoc promotion chance at 15%; mentoring
bonus to research quality at 0.5; new postdoc stress and end-
of-contract stress at 0.3. The mentoring bonus was turned
off in certain scenarios.
Following these analyses, we recorded the results of 8,000
runs of the simulation across a comprehensive range of pa-
rameter settings and then performed a detailed sensitivity
analysis. These techniques will be described in more detail
in the Sensitivity Analysis subsection below.
Scenario Set 1: Postdocs vs Permanent Academics
The first set of scenarios compares four different postdoc
scenarios to the baseline scenario in which the population
consists entirely of permanent academics. These four sce-
narios correspond to the four possible combinations of the
RQ and M parameter settings described above:
Table 1: Postdoc Scenarios – Set 1
Scenario Name Settings
noRQnoM Random promotions, no mentoring
noRQM Random promotions, mentoring
RQnoM Non-random promotions, no mentoring
RQM Non-random promotions, mentoring
Figure 1 provides a comparison of mean research output
per academic across these five scenarios. The results are av-
eraged across fifty runs of the simulation for each scenario,
and the error bars indicate the standard deviation. The basic
growing population scenario outperforms all four postdoc
Figure 3: Mean research output per academic for five dif-
ferent values of the promotion chance parameter.
Figure 4: Total research output across the system for five
different values of the promotion chance parameter.
scenarios on this measure; in the postdoc scenarios, men-
toring appears to be the most important driver of increased
research output. Perhaps surprisingly, promoting postdocs
randomly or non-randomly seems to make little difference
to the final outcome. Results suggest that the drop in re-
search output in the postdoc scenarios may derive from the
instability introduced by a constant influx of postdocs with
unpredictable research quality; the fact that agents require
a longer memory in the postdoc scenario in order to settle
on stable time allocation strategies supports this interpreta-
tion. Postdocs are also ineligible for grant-related research
bonuses, which negatively affects research output levels.
Figure 2 shows another comparison between the five sce-
narios, this time for total research output across the whole
academic system. The figures displayed here are the mean
final research outputs averaged across fifty simulation runs
for each scenario. Again we see that the basic growing popu-
lation case outperforms every postdoc scenario, even though
only half as many permanent academics are hired in that sce-
nario. Mentoring again takes precedence in the postdoc sce-
narios, as the mechanics of promotion seem to make little
difference to the final outcome.
Scenario Set 2: Promotion Chance
In this second set of scenarios we compared the final outputs
of simulation runs using five different values of the promo-
tion chance parameter. This parameter sets the likelihood
of a given postdoc being promoted into a permanent posi-
tion. In this set of scenarios we used parameter settings for
the RQM scenarios from Set 1, as these seemed to provide
the most favourable results among the possible postdoc sce-
narios. All other parameters were kept at the default values
indicated in the model description above.
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the mean research out-
put per academic at the end of the simulation. Again each
scenario was run fifty times and the error bars indicate the
standard deviation. In this set of scenarios the 100% promo-
tion scenario was the most successful; these runs gave us the
highest values for mean research output out of any postdoc
scenarios we ran.
In Figure 4 we provide a comparison of total research out-
put across the entire system using the same five values for
promotion chance. Here we see a marked increase in over-
all research productivity when 100% of postdocs are pro-
moted – the mean total output is significantly more than
double what we see at 15%. However, this clearly would
be the most expensive option in a postdoc-employing aca-
demic world – in a later subsection we will examine the cost
issue in more detail.
Scenario Set 3: Job-Hunting and Stress
In the third set of scenarios, we investigate the impact of
job insecurity on research output. As described in the in-
troduction, a number of studies of postdocs and fixed-term
academics have revealed the difficult consequences of inse-
cure and low-paid academic work on individuals. In order
to represent the potential negative impact of these stressors,
we have implemented a small research quality penalty, set
to 0.3 by default, which represents the impact of postdocs
needing to spend time searching for academic jobs, many of
which require lengthy and detailed application processes to
be completed, and the stress caused caused by impending
redundancy.
For these analyses we again collected data from sets of
50 simulation runs for five different values of the key pa-
rameter, in this case the job-hunting/stress penalty applied
to postdocs reaching the end of their contracts. We decided
to set the upper bound for job stress at 0.7, as we felt it rea-
sonable to assume that most postdoc positions, while poten-
tially stressful, would likely not take up more than 70% of
Figure 5: Mean research output per academic for five dif-
ferent values of the job-hunting stress parameter.
Figure 6: Total research output across the system for five
different values of the job-hunting stress parameter.
researchers’ time due to that stress.
Figure 5 shows a clear downward trend in mean research
output for individual academics as the level of job stress in-
creases, and Figure 6 shows a near-identical result for total
research output across the entire system. We note that in
all of these scenarios postdocs only represent approximately
10-15% of the total academic population at the end of a nor-
mal simulation run, and yet the impact of this stress param-
eter is very significant.
This result indicates the prominent role that even this
small population of postdocs has in the research landscape.
Established academics must divide their time between re-
search and bid preparation, and failed bids often lead re-
searchers to put enormous amounts of time into the next
round of preparations. As a consequence, established aca-
demics tend to enter periods of ‘feast or famine’ in which
they either spend all their time writing bids and failing to
produce any research, or they succeed with several applica-
tions in a row and feel safe in reducing their bid preparation
time in order to increase their research output – which is then
further increased by the research bonus added by the grant
itself.
In contrast, postdocs devote 100% of their available time
to research, and since they cannot apply for grants they are
not distracted from their work by the grant-funding lottery.
During the average simulation run postdocs frequently av-
erage nearly double the research output of established aca-
demics, with only top-achieving grant-holders able to ex-
ceed their productivity. Postdocs thus take up the slack in
the research community while everyone else fights to win
grants. As a result, postdocs account for a significant frac-
tion of the overall research output, and thus reductions to
their productivity have a strong impact on the overall re-
search output of the academic population.
Sensitivity Analysis
Despite the relative simplicity of the agent behaviours in this
model, the system does incorporate a number of elements
which may interact in unexpected ways. In order to further
understand the dynamics of the model we looked to uncer-
tainty quantification methods, which can allow us to delve
deeper into the effects of each model parameter on research
outcomes.
Our chosen method was inspired by a previous UK re-
search project known as Managing Uncertainty in Complex
Models, or MUCM (http://www.mucm.ac.uk/). The
MUCM team developed some specialised software specifi-
cally for use in the analysis of complex computational mod-
els. One of these pieces of software, GEM-SA, implements
a Gaussian process emulator, which allows us to perform an
in-depth sensitivity analysis of complex computational mod-
els with multiple input parameters (O’Hagan, 2006), includ-
ing agent-based models (Silverman et al., 2013).
Detailing the construction of Gaussian process emulators
is beyond the scope of the current paper, so we recommend
reading Kennedy and O’Hagan (2001) for further details.
To summarise briefly, Gaussian process emulators provide a
measure of the influence of each individual input parameter
on the total output variance of the simulation. The emula-
tor works on the assumption that the single output variable
specified – total research output at the end of the simula-
tion, in this case – can be understood as a composition of a
series of main effects driven by the input parameters, inter-
action effects for all combinations of those parameters, and
a constant term. In the current implementation, additional
uncertainty introduced by the computer code itself is also
taken into account. In essence, the emulator builds a statisti-
cal model of the computer model based on an input training
set.
For this sensitivity analysis we chose four key input pa-
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Figure 7: Results of Gaussian Process Emulator demonstrating the impact of four input parameters on final research output
values for the whole system. The emulator was run with 400 different parameter combinations; each combination was run 20
times and the outputs averaged. Source: GEM-SA software (own calculations).
rameters – postdoc promotion chance, mentoring bonus for
just-promoted postdocs, and the stress caused by entering a
new position and by leaving a position. The final output of
interest was the total research output across the system at the
end state of the simulation.
GEM-SA requires a large training set in order to produce
good results, so we generated a set of 400 possible param-
eter combinations for these four inputs – the maximum al-
lowable in the GEM-SA software. Promotion chance values
ranged between 0.15 – 1.0, mentoring bonus between 0.3 –
0.7, and job stress for both entering and leaving positions
between 0.1 – 0.7. We then ran each one of those 400 set-
tings 20 times, resulting in 8,000 total simulation runs, and
took the mean of the total research output for each setting,
then passed those results to GEM-SA.
Table 2 provides a summary of the GEM-SA output af-
ter 41,000 runs of the emulator. We can clearly see that
the single largest driver of research output in these postdoc
scenarios is the likelihood of postdoc promotion, which ac-
counts for 86.43% of the final output variance. The mentor-
ing bonus provided to newly-minted academics is the second
largest contributor, accounting for 8.87% of the output vari-
ance. Job-hunting stress at the end of a contract plays a small
role in the final results, but interestingly stress due to enter-
ing a new position is largely inconsequential – this could be
due to the tendency for new academics to struggle to achieve
consistent outcomes regardless of their stress levels, at least
until they settle into a more stable pattern of bid preparation.
In Figure 7 we provide the graphs generated by the GEM-
Table 2: Effect on output variance from input parameters
Parameter Variance (%)
Promotion Chance 86.43
Mentoring Bonus 8.87
New Postdoc Stress 0.08
Job-Hunting Stress 2.57
Promotion x Mentoring 1.31
Promotion x New Stress 0.01
Promotion x Job-Hunt Stress 0.69
Other Interactions 0.02
SA software, which show the effects of each input parame-
ter on total research output. The graph demonstrates that as
the postdoc promotion chance increases, the total research
output increases as well – and once again the effect on the
final output is significant despite the relatively small size of
the postdoc population. Similarly, the size of the mentoring
bonus applied to newly-promoted postdocs has a positive
impact on total research output, although significantly less
pronounced than the effect of promotion chance. Both start-
ing a new job and reaching the end of a contract appear to
impact negatively on research output, though the influence
from the latter is somewhat variable. This makes intuitive
sense, given that the amount of postdocs eligible for redun-
dancy in each simulation will vary significantly depending
on random factors in the simulation, in contrast to new-job
stress which every postdoc is guaranteed to experience.
Return on Investment
While the results to this point reinforce the interpretation
that higher rates of postdoc promotion lead to greater re-
search output, in the real world this would have substantial
cost implications. Postdocs are welcomed by universities as
employees given that their salaries are paid for by external
funding in most cases – taking those employees on as per-
manent academics requires a significant investment from the
university’s point of view.
In order to better judge the cost-effectiveness of these
scenarios, we implemented a very simple return on invest-
ment (ROI) calculation as a rough indicator of relative per-
formance between scenarios. The simulation compares its
total research output in a given time step to a funding-free
scenario in which we calculate the research output of the
current agent population if they were able to spend 100%
of their time doing research only. Research outputs linked
to funding – grant-related research quality bonuses and all
postdoc research output – are removed. The ROI is then de-
fined as the difference between the funded research output
and the funding-free output, divided by the amount of fund-
ing disbursed. This gives us a measure of the amount of
additional research purchased with each unit of funding.
Figure 8 shows a comparison of ROI for five promotion
chance scenarios. Note that all results are in the negative –
in other tests we also found that postdoc scenarios produced
less research despite the increase in investment compared to
the base case. Perhaps surprisingly, ROI becomes less poor
in the higher promotion chance scenarios – so despite the
additional cost, in a world with postdocs promoting more
of them seems to produce dividends in terms of increased
research output for the money spent.
Figure 8: Results of ROI calculations for five postdoc
promotion scenarios.
Discussion
While the core functionality of this simulation is relatively
simple, understanding the complex agent behaviour and its
consequences requires in-depth analysis. The multiple sets
of scenarios presented here are intended to provide a rela-
tively complete picture of the simulation outcomes across a
range of parameter settings, and to give a comparison be-
tween the postdoc and non-postdoc scenarios.
In Scenario Set 1 we compared the postdoc scenarios with
a growing population in which half as many permanent aca-
demics were hired. Notably, in every case the non-postdoc
scenarios produced higher individual research productivity
and higher total productivity. In Scenario Set 2 and 3 we
examined two unique properties of the postdoc agents: their
chance for promotion, and the job-hunting stress they feel
toward the end of their contracts. We found that higher pro-
motion chances lead to significantly higher research output,
both individually and for the whole population. Unsurpris-
ingly we found that higher stress leads to lower output – but
the effects were surprisingly strong given the small size of
the postdoc populations. The sensitivity analysis reinforces
the results of Scenario Set 2, showing that postdoc promo-
tion chance is driving the majority of the output variance in
the postdoc scenarios.
These results lead us to conclude that in this simple model
of postdoc careers in a competitive funding environment, the
career path of postdocs has a significant impact on research
productivity across the academic system. Postdocs end up
accounting for a large fraction of the overall research output
in the simulation while established academics get caught up
in competing for grant funding, so the impact of job-related
stress and poor mentoring is also felt across the population.
Unfortunately this does not bode well for real-world
academia, as studies repeatedly confirm the poor mentor-
ing and career development offered to postdocs around the
world (Felisberti and Sear, 2014; A˚kerlind, 2005). Post-
docs regularly report significant anxiety about their career
prospects, problems making ends meet financially, and a
lack of career guidance and institutional support. The simu-
lation shows that leaving postdocs to shoulder these burdens
unsupported may have unexpectedly severe impact on our
research productivity.
There are indications that this careers guidance aspect is
being taken more seriously. In the UK institutions have
signed up in large numbers to the Concordat to Support the
Development of Researchers (Vitae, 2008), an agreement
which calls on institutions and funders to develop strong
frameworks for researchers’ career development. However,
this simulation suggests that offering supportive work en-
vironments and career advice may not be sufficient – max-
imising the sector’s research potential would involve a more
substantive rethink of the current state of academic careers
and funding.
This simulation is only an abstract representation of the
funding and careers situation in academia, and should not
be taken as a recipe for policy at this early stage. However,
these results do give us a sense of the dynamics at work
between competitive funding systems and postdoctoral re-
searchers. In a system which highly incentivises senior aca-
demics to spend significant time on grant applications, post-
docs are intended to fill the research gaps – but when those
same postdocs’ careers are tied to insecure short-term fund-
ing, research funders end up actually getting fewer outputs
for their money.
Future work will need to examine these systems in more
detail. At the moment, grants are represented very simply:
one grant is much like another; and any single grant only at-
tracts one postdoc. Further differentiation between types of
research funding may help us develop some new methods of
research funding disbursement that could alleviate some of
these issues. Future versions of the model would also benefit
from additional detail on the postdoc life course – postdocs
in this simulation only have one contract and one attempt to
achieve promotion, whereas in the real world postdocs often
work on a succession of fixed-term contracts.
Similarly, the treatment and experience of postdocs varies
significantly between countries, disciplines, and even be-
tween individual institutions – this model is based on the
postdoc situation at research-intensive universities in the
UK. In the real world postdocs may face a wide variety of
obstacles depending on where they may be employed, which
could substantially change their coping strategies. Under-
standing the lived experience of postdocs through quantita-
tive and qualitative studies and incorporating this data into a
more sophisticated decision-making model would allow for
a more detailed representation of the varied postdoc career
landscape.
While these results look dire for the postdoc scenarios, we
do not believe this is due to unjust assumptions on our part.
This model is relatively optimistic: more postdocs get pro-
moted in the simulation than in many real-world academic
systems; ROI calculations do not include costs like redun-
dancy payments or training costs for new postdocs; and 30%
of all grants are funded regardless of the number of appli-
cants. Even in this relatively positive environment, postdoc
scenarios still underperform compared to non-postdoc sce-
narios, and our return on investment is quite poor. While
we reiterate that the model is too early to serve as a driver
for substantive policy, we suggest that it provides food for
thought when the academic community wishes to evaluate
its performance, both as researchers and as employers.
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